State loses battle for Valsayn lands

Justice Westmin James. -

A long-running dispute between an engineering firm and the Housing Development Corporation (HDC) over the ownership of more than eight acres of State land in Valsayn South through adverse possession has been settled by the High Court.

Justice Westmin James found that Dipcon Engineering Services Ltd lawfully acquired ownership and exercised open, exclusive and continuous possession of the land for well beyond the statutory limitation period, extinguishing the State’s title and entitling the company to possession of the property.

Dipcon was represented by Colin Kangaloo, SC, Simone Jaggernauth-Clarke and John Lee.

Roger Mark Kawalsingh and Anala Mohan represented the Attorney General and Deborah Peake, SC, Ravi Heffes-Doon and Andre Rudder represented the HDC.

The claim centred on a parcel at Real Springs East, Valsayn South, near the Southern Main Road, which Dipcon said it had occupied and controlled since May 1981. The Attorney General and the Housing Development Corporation argued that the land was acquired by the State in 1979 for public purposes and later vested in State housing authorities, giving the defendants paper title.

In a 50-page judgment, the court traced the history of the land, noting that Dipcon first entered the property without permission to support construction works on the Valsayn housing project and thereafter made extensive improvements. Evidence showed the company cleared and filled the land, erected buildings and fencing, installed utilities, operated a concrete batching plant, and maintained security and continuous use for commercial purposes over several decades.

A central legal issue was whether time spent in occupation while the land was owned by the State could count toward adverse possession after the property was transferred to a non-State entity. Justice James held that Dipcon’s possession satisfied the applicable limitation period and that the subsequent vesting of the land in housing authorities did not defeat the accrued rights.

The court rejected arguments that Dipcon lacked the necessary intention to possess the land, finding that its conduct demonstrated a clear intent to control and exclude others, including the paper title holders. “The only reasonable inference,” the judge wrote, was that Dipcon occupied and used the land openly and exclusively for a period well in excess of the statutory requirement.

“The claimant’s evidence establishes that possession commenced in or about May 1981, when Dipcon Ltd entered the lands and utilised them as a base of operations in

connection with the Real Spring, Valsayn Housing Project.

“From that point onward, the land was not merely entered sporadically but was actively transformed and used in a manner consistent only with occupation by an owner. The physical acts of possession were substantial and enduring. They included the clearing

and filling of approximately seven acres, the erection of a concrete batching plant,

maintenance garage, mobile offices, septic facilities, paved access roads and parking

areas, and the installation of perimeter fencing with a controlled northern entrance.

“Utilities—water, electricity and telecommunications—were installed to service these operations. These are not transient or equivocal acts; they are acts of dominion.Even after the completion of the housing project in the mid-1980s, possession did not cease.

“Rather, the nature of the use evolved, which is entirely consistent with continuous

possession.

“From 1985 onwards, the claimant used the lands for stockpiling construction materials, storing heavy and retired equipment, maintaining paved areas and access

roads, and securing the site through watchmen and controlled access.

“ A change in intensity or purpose of use does not interrupt possession; it merely reflects the changing needs of the occupier.

“I am therefore satisfied that the claimant has discharged the burden of proving, with

sufficient clarity and precision, the identity and extent of the land it occupied.”

As a result, the High Court declared that the State’s interest in the disputed land had been extinguished and that Dipcon is entitled to possession.

While upholding the claim against the HDC, the judge dismissed the corporation's counter-claim against Dipcon and also dismissed the engineering firm's claim against the Attorney General.